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Executive Summary  
 
Introduction 
 
1. This report extends the recent work of the Centre for Research on the Wider Benefits 
of Learning to consider the robust quantitative evidence for links between learning at 
all stages of the life-cycle and costable outcomes. 
 
2. A great many assumptions are required to develop costed benefits of education based 
on the information available. In particular, linearity assumptions, partial equilibria 
assumptions and assumptions of the estimation techniques used are all important. 
These caveats must be strongly borne in mind in interpreting the results contained in 
this report. The exercise has been conducted as only a first step in the Centre for 
Research on the Wider Benefits of Learning’s programme of quantitative research. 
All conclusions are therefore given tentatively and thought of as indicative only. 
 
3. The report stresses the importance of estimation techniques that deal with 
confounding factors and other sources of bias, particularly the selection bias that 
results from the fact that people with higher levels of education receive benefits that 
may be due to a common set of underlying advantages that influence both education 
and the outcome variables. Econometric techniques are used to deal with this 
problem. 
 
Key findings on the crime reduction benefits of academic and vocational 
training 
 
4. A US study has investigated the effect of high school graduation on incarceration. 
Robust econometric techniques deal with selection and other biases. A ten percentage 
point rise in the rate of high school graduation would cut the murder (arrest) rate by 
between 14% and 27%. A 1 percentage point increase in the graduation rate would 
lead to a reduction in crime of between 34,000 and 68,000 offences, with a social 
benefit of $0.9 billion to $1.9 billion per annum. 
 
5. A UK study is described that exploits area level crime data for the 43 police force 
areas of England and Wales (excluding the City of London), 1975-1996, to consider 
the effect of wages on crime. The study uses a fixed effects method and so is robust to 
most criticisms of bias. 
 
6. The UK study finds that a 10 percent rise in the average pay of those on low pay in an 
area reduces the overall area property crime rate by between 0.7 and 1.0 percentage 
points. This report estimates that this benefit would be worth between £1.3 and £1.8 
billion in an average year over the period. 
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7. Further work undertaken for this report and subject to the many, important caveats 
made in point 3 above, suggests that the benefit in terms of reduced crime through the 
effect on wages of a 1 point increase in the proportion of the working age area 
population with O Level or equivalent qualifications, is predicted to lie between £10 
million and £320 million. 
 
8. The benefit if 1 extra percentage point of those in the area population with O Levels, 
reached A Level or equivalent qualifications and those with O Levels or equivalent 
who progressed were replaced by those who had previously had no qualifications, is 
predicted to lie between £80 million and £500 million. Assuming linearity, a 5 point 
increase would have effects of between £400 million and £2,500 million. 
 
9. If the effects of wages on property crime were applied to other forms of crime, in 
particular violent crime, the benefits would increase by a factor of 2.7. For example, 
if the proportion of the working age population with no qualifications was reduced by 
1 percentage point and those people achieved A Level or equivalent qualifications, 
the saving in reduced crime would then be £665 million per year. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The wider benefits of learning represent a new and exciting topic of study. There is 
considerable uncertainty about the effects of learning but a widely held belief that many 
aspects of life are improved by education, with considerable plausible benefits for the 
economy. There is, however, so far little evidence to support these hypothesised benefits 
and the evidence that exists is disparate, concerns widely different aspects of learning, 
based on different measures of learning through different kinds of channels, in different 
kinds of areas.  
 
Schuller et al. (2001) considered the benefits of learning across a very wide range of 
domains of potential benefit, in terms of crime, health, parenting, aging and social 
cohesion. Both quantitative and qualitative evidence was reviewed in order to provide an 
overview of available evidence and to suggest a conceptual framework for future 
investigations. This report will focus on crime, describing in more detail the available, 
robust quantitative evidence and modelling the cost implications of this evidence, i.e. to 
estimate how much would be saved in terms of the reduced social cost of crime if 
educational investments were successful. The report draws on the framework provided by 
Schuller et al. but is more specific about the kind of evidence described. It also goes 
further in drawing out the implications of the evidence for Government spending 
decisions1. 
 
1.1 The virtues and limitations of cost-benefit analysis 
 
The term ‘cost-benefit analysis’ refers to the attempt to put financial figures to the pros 
and cons associated with any decision. If the estimated benefit of a project outweighs the 
predicted cost then an analyst has good grounds to recommend the project. 
 
Not all aspects of the lives of individuals are amenable to the kind of cost-benefit analysis 
presented here. There are considerable dangers to these methods being applied without 
concern for their limitations or in inappropriate contexts. House (2000) discusses the 
infamous 1991 recommendation by the then Chief Economist of the World Bank (the 
distinguished economist, Laurence Summers) that dirty industries were better sited in less 
developed countries. The reasoning was that: 
                                                 
1 A sister report will consider and cost the quantitative evidence for health benefits. Future papers will 
return to the evidence investigated here and develop new evidence. 
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“the measurement of the costs of health-impairing pollution depends on the 
foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this point of 
view a given amount of health-impairing pollution should be done with the lowest 
wages.” 
 
This argument boils down to the suggestion that the health of those in poor countries 
(with the lowest wages and lowest purchasing power parities) is less important than that 
of those in richer countries because those in poorer countries are, in economic terms, less 
productive (i.e. they earn less). The assumption that earnings reflect value itself elides at 
least two assumptions, firstly that earnings reflect productivity, second that productivity 
reflects value.  
 
The problem with that analysis is not that it attempts to reduce the relative costs involved 
in a particular decision to their monetary values, or even that it attempts to apply cost 
analysis to health but rather that in making its conclusions it fails to take into account the 
limitations of the resulting analysis for subsequent decision making. In other words, the 
assumptions are everything. It could be argued that the analysis is justified, as a 
(relatively small) piece in the puzzle but is hugely insufficient without the necessary 
additional considerations.   
 
There are dangers in appraisal, evaluation or cost-benefit analysis but, in context, the 
evidence they can provide is important. Since the instigation by the Treasury of the 
Comprehensive Spending Review in 1998, UK Government departments are required to 
look at the effectiveness of spending. It is not a sufficient basis for departments to argue 
for spending on the basis of tradition, ideology or conjecture. Evidence-based policy 
requires that, where possible, spending decisions are made on the basis of evidence about 
the relative effectiveness of the available policy options. One might believe, for example, 
that education or training programmes would reduce crime but in order to determine how 
much should be spent on such programmes, it is important to know by how much they 
might reduce crime and what the resulting savings of such crime reduction might be. The 
Treasury ‘Green Book’ (HMSO, 1997), which guides departments in their contributions 
to the Spending Review process gives a clear statement of the limitations and value of 
any evaluation or appraisal technique: 
 
“Although a great deal of information can be brought within and presented in 
terms of a formal framework, this can never do more than inform the final decision. 
Analysis can show how alternative choices compare in many ways, but there will 
always be further strategic, or pragmatic issues to which those responsible for final 
decisions must also give weight.” (HMSO, 1997) 
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This current report is an attempt to inform policy-makers and others about the potential 
monetary benefits of higher levels of educational participation in terms of reduced levels 
of crime. That requires a detailed examination of the evidence for a link, based on a 
theoretical understanding of the underpinnings of that link. The link is then matched to 
estimates of the cost of crime to provide formal evidence about the likely effectiveness of 
educational interventions in reducing crime in cash terms.  
 
A great many assumptions are necessary along the way and it is important to emphasise 
heavily the point that the results presented here represent work in progress. The data is 
not yet available to achieve what is really the objective here, namely to estimate the effect 
of education on criminal activity, even if it is possible to surmount all the estimation 
difficulties that result from the fact that there is no natural experiment in which to base 
the analysis.  
 
Given the lack of suitable data, this study is forced to link disparate results from different 
data-sets, being as careful as possible about the process of linking, recognising and 
making explicit the large uncertainty that is introduced by taking results from different 
data-sets, at different time-periods. The results presented here are, therefore, intended to 
provide some guide about plausible magnitudes of effects. They are not thought of as 
precise estimates of the true relation. 
 
This introduction will briefly describe the framework adopted for the report. Section 2 
will describe the overall picture or jigsaw puzzle of the wider benefits of learning with 
respect to crime. Section 3 will summarise and cost the quantified evidence, putting into 
place the available pieces of this section of the puzzle.  
 
1.2 Aspects of learning considered 
 
The term ‘learning’ refers to an extremely broad set of potential educational experiences 
and interventions. The priority in this report is to consider: 
 
i) educational interventions, primarily but not exclusively academic and vocational 
training, leading to qualifications, and;  
 
ii) specific formal but not necessarily assessed or certified interventions such as 
educational programmes for prisoners. 
 
This limitation is not driven by any theoretical or ethical consideration but by simple 
empirical necessity - the objective is to summarise the robust quantitative evidence. Only 
certain kinds of learning have been evaluated in the necessary ways.  
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It must also be pointed out that, for simplicity, the terms ‘education’, ‘schooling’ and 
‘learning’ are sometimes used without clear demarcation or discussion of the precise 
differences in meaning except where necessary for precision. The distinctions are 
important but better dealt with elsewhere.  
 
1.3 Direct and indirect effects 
 
Section 2 on theory will provide a brief description of the hypothesised benefits of 
learning. It is pointed out here however, that as Figure 1 (below) emphasises, there are 
essentially three main channels through which learning effects are modelled.  
 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect is the direct effect, the way in which learning changes 
the way we live. Although particularly interesting, this area is particularly under-
researched quantitatively. This report therefore, focuses primarily on the income and 
parenting effects of learning. The income effect is crucial because the link between 
education and income is well established. It is possible to merge this information with 
other evidence on the link between income and crime and on the costs of crime. The 
result is an evidence-based, costed benefit of education. 
 
Figure 1: Direct and indirect effects of learning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is also a well-established body of evidence about the importance of early years and 
parenting interventions. These are included here but it is emphasised that the studies from 
which such results are derived are commonly based on small samples and from 
programmes which it would be extremely difficult to replicate on a national scale. 
 
 
Learning 
Intervention 
Positive 
Outcome 
Income 
Parenting 
Intergenerational 
Effects 
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1.4 The applicability of evidence from the US 
 
Most quantitative evidence comes from American studies. This is partly because of the 
quality of data available and the quality and funding of the research community but also 
because the large population and Federal system allow the possibility of using inter-state 
variation to identify robust policy effects. This evidence gives some very useful results 
but there is a clear difficulty in assuming that the findings will apply to the UK. Given 
that research on the wider benefits of learning is so new that robust findings are in short 
supply, it has been decided that it is helpful to include American findings in this study. 
 
 
2. The links: theory 
 
There are a number of reasons why education and other learning interventions may have 
an affect on crime (Figure 1, p. 6). Some of these effects are direct, through changes in 
behaviour or preferences, others indirect, through resulting changes in opportunities, 
particularly through income. This section, therefore, clarifies the links that have been 
hypothesised and indicate the relative strength of evidence available for each of these 
links.  
 
It is important to recognise that a simple correlation between education and the outcomes 
of interest may mask a number of possible effects that may not be due to education. This 
section, therefore, also describes possible confounding factors so as to clarify the extent 
to which even multivariate analyses may mislead. Section 3 provides the detailed 
evidence. 
 
2.1 Channels 
 
This report gives five potential channels for an effect of education on crime: 
 
1. The income effect. 
Through its effect on income, education raises the opportunity cost of time spent 
engaged in criminal activity or in subsequent incarceration. In other words it reduces 
the ratio of incentives to risks. According to sociological ‘strain theory’ (Merton, 
1938), income also reduces the frustration that might otherwise lead to crime. Those 
who can earn more are hence less likely to engage in crime. Since education 
increases potential wages, it reduces crime indirectly. 
 
2. Direct effects on patience and/or risk aversion.  
Patience and risk-aversion are central to the economic model of decision-making 
including that of participation in crime (see, for example, Lochner & Moretti). Future 
returns from activities are discounted according to one’s patience in waiting for 
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them. Thus, individuals with a lot of patience have low discount rates and value 
future earnings more highly than those with high discount rates. If education reduces 
discount rates (increases patience) it reduces the propensity to commit crime since 
potential punishments extend into the future and the threat of future punishments will 
bear more heavily in any decision on whether or not to engage in crime. Of course, 
patience is difficult to observe directly in large data sets and so the magnitude of this 
effect has not been estimated quantitatively.  
Second, education will reduce crime if it increases risk aversion. Again there is little 
evidence. 
 
3. Direct effects on the return to crime.  
To the extent that education increases the earnings one can derive from crime, the 
association of crime and education is positively influenced. The positive association 
of education and white-collar crime is an interesting and under-researched area but it 
is also plausible that there is an effect of training and skills on property crime. For 
example, in US individual level data, Levitt and Lochner (2000) find that controlling 
for a number of important family background, region and ethnicity factors, males 
with higher maths scores commit fewer offences but those with higher scores on 
mechanical information tests had increased offence rates. This is compatible with the 
fact that mathematical ability finds returns only in the legitimate labour market, 
while mechanical knowledge also finds returns in crime.    
 
4. Delinquency and the direct effects on the pleasure gained from crime.  
The role of pleasure in the determination of crime is most important for teenage 
crime, i.e. for delinquency. In the Cambridge study, Farrington (2001) reports that 
when asked their own reasons for criminal participation, teenagers talk about 
enjoyment whereas older men talk about the material returns to the activity. 
However, since most crime is committed by teenagers (see the well-known age-
crime curve) the pleasure factor is extremely important and one must attempt to 
address the question of what role education might play in mitigating this aspect.  
 
One might consider here the effect of education and learning on empathy but perhaps 
more immediately empirically tractable is the effect of being in school on limiting 
the opportunity for participating in the pleasurable activity of crime. Also important 
is the role of education in the selection of peer groups. Farrington reports the very 
strong finding that whereas crime committed by those over 17 is mainly solitary, that 
pre-17 is mainly in groups. This issue is returned to in Section 3.1.2 where the crime 
reduction benefits of increasing educational participation amongst teenagers are 
estimated. 
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5. The inter-generational effect.  
Farrington et al (1996) have established that offending is strongly concentrated in 
families so that, for example, in the Cambridge study, half of all convictions were 
accounted for by 6% of families. The causal mechanism for this intergenerational 
transmission of offending is not well understood, although Farrington et al. also find 
that 61% of convicted mothers in the study were married to convicted fathers, as 
opposed to 23% of unconvicted mothers. In other words, offending runs in families 
but this may be for environmental or genetic reasons or, more likely, unknown 
combinations of the two2. Clearly, cultural factors such as parental expectations, 
intergenerational learning and family ethics are also important here as are income 
and employment constraints and opportunities as suggested by the economic 
literature. 
 
Whatever the level of criminality of parents, there is evidence that parenting skills have 
implications for the criminality of their children although, again, the nature of this 
relation is not well understood. For example, skills such as erratic or harsh discipline, low 
supervision or maternal rejection (Rutter et al., 1998; Daag 1991; Sampson & Laub, 
1993) have been shown to be associated with subsequent criminal involvement. To the 
extent that these are associated with education, an inter-generational education effect is 
created. More importantly, this evidence raises the possibility of family-based 
interventions to reduce subsequent crime. The success of such programmes is reviewed in 
Section 3.2. 
 
2.2 Confounding factors and other sources of bias 
 
An individual may engage in crime for any one of a number of unobservable reasons. 
These may be related to the individual’s patience, risk aversion, capability in criminal 
activities or pleasure gained from crime. Consider individuals with such unobservable 
characteristics that lead them towards crime. If schooling does not increase the return to 
crime for such crime-prone individuals, then they are likely to engage in less schooling. 
Thus, even without any actual causal effect of education on crime, the two will be 
negatively associated in data. This result would also follow if crime-prone individuals 
had low patience for school or found school particularly unpleasant. 
 
It is clearly, therefore, important to deal with the bias resulting from unobservable 
factors. One way of doing this is to proxy such factors with measures that are observed. 
This can have important results. For example, in a meta-analysis of the evidence on the 
link between educational problems in adolescents and delinquency, defined as self-
reported or officially recorded adolescent criminality, Maguin and Loeber (1996) find in 
bivariate analysis that those with low educational attainment are more than twice as likely 
                                                 
2 Moffitt (1987) investigated the criminal records of 5,659 Danish male adoptees and of their biological 
parents and found no evidence of a genetic link. 
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as those with high attainment to be delinquent. This is on the basis of 145 cross-sectional 
studies. However, when the studies conduct multivariate analysis controlling specifically 
for intelligence, the educational attainment-delinquent effect is removed. Intelligence is, 
in other words, a crucial confounding factor. However, to a certain extent intelligence is 
an outcome of education and so this result does not indicate that there is no benefit to 
such investments. Rather, it points to the difficulties in establishing which variables are to 
be used to measure the educational investments received and which to proxy for 
unobserved confounding factors. We must turn to theory to answer this question. 
 
2.2.1 Developmental versus econometric approaches 
 
Because of these complexities, this report focuses firstly on those studies which have 
attempted more sophisticated approaches to the problem of establishing causality. These 
are described in more detail below. However, these more causal approaches are drawn 
from the econometric literature which takes a less general perspective than that from 
developmental criminology as described by Sampson and Laub (1993) for example. The 
developmental approach is concerned less with single causes than with the role of groups 
of risk factors. For example, Farrington (1990 and 1993) argues that the primary 
indicators of offending are: 
 
• socio-economic deprivation, e.g. poor housing, low parental education, large family 
etc.; 
• poor parenting; 
• delinquency in other family member(s); 
• school problems; 
• manifested psychological problems such as hyperactivity or attention deficit. 
 
The educational attainments of parents and children, therefore, partly determine the risk 
of criminality and partly mediate the effects of other risk factors.  
 
In addition, there are clearly a great number of interactions between these different risk 
factors but the developmental perspective is not concerned to establish which risk factor 
is key. This approach does not ‘solve’ the problem of causality but rather establishes the 
common factors that must be taken into account by any policy. A successful policy can 
cause effects on all risk factors as well as on the desired outcome without ever clarifying 
the precise causal mechanism. 
 
The focus on effectiveness is very useful for policy makers and the developmental 
perspective has been extremely influential in recent UK policy reviews. It underlies, for 
example, the recent Home Office review on research evidence (Nuttall et al., 1998), 
which emphasises the importance of multiple interventions: 
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“It is now accepted that to be effective, prevention programmes need to 
comprise a range of complementary measures which target multiple risk factors 
within the primary domains of a child’s life.”  
 
and 
 
“children exposed to multiple risks and those who engage in anti-social or 
criminal behaviour at any early age are more likely to end up as serious or 
persistent offenders.”  
 
This multi-dimensional approach has the virtue of recognising the inherent complexity of 
the determination of crime and of approaches to crime prevention. However, it does not 
lead to the estimation of effect parameters. This is partly because many influential studies 
have been conducted on small samples in which multivariate analysis is impossible and 
partly because the emphasis has been on clarifying ideas, rather than estimating effects.  
 
However, another useful aspect of this approach is the concern with the developmental 
aspects of the careers of criminals. Particularly important is the idea of the professional, 
persistent or chronic offender. The previous Home Secretary referred in January (2001) to 
the 100,000 offenders who account for half of all crime3. This is similar in nature to the 
important distinction between adolescent limited and life-course persistent offending 
(Moffitt, 1993) and leads to the implication that if education could reduce the criminality 
of chronic offenders then this would have considerable leverage on the overall reduction 
of the cost of crime. This would not just be through reducing their own criminal activities 
but also of those they influence including peers and their children.  
 
However, it may be that these individuals are particularly hard to influence through 
preventative educational rather than psychological interventions and that the schooling 
system is not currently designed to reduce chronic offending. Rather, it may be that 
education is better targeted at the 50% of crime that is not committed by chronic 
offenders but which schooling interventions are likely to have an impact upon. Section 
3.2 describes the available evidence for these two possibilities which, sadly, is not yet 
sufficient to derive costed benefits of schooling based on this developmental model. 
 
2.2.2 The measurement of crime 
 
It is also important to recognise that quantitative crime research is never based on the 
observation of actual crime. As Figure 2 makes clear, there are many stages between a 
crime taking place and recording of the data. At each stage, measurement error at best but  
                                                 
3 This evidence comes from Offenders’ Index Data.  This number is equivalent to 6% of all individuals or 
18% of all offenders.  Home Office (1995).  
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more likely bias is introduced. For example, data based on reports to the Police misses all 
unreported crime. Studies of the determinants of crime based on the characteristics of 
those arrested suffers from the bias that certain groups may be particularly targeted by the 
police or more likely to be caught. Other, similar biases may be introduced into studies 
based on those in prison or those who self-report crime. This caveat is important but it 
should be remembered that all the kinds of data described do contain valuable 
information that can be analysed and made useful provided appropriate care is taken. 
 
Figure 2: The stages of crime data collection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The links: evidence-based benefits of the effects on 
crime 
 
As discussed in Section 3, there is a considerable body of evidence about the association 
of education and crime. For example, Graham and Bowling (1995), have found that those 
who truanted from school were more than three times as likely to offend. It is relatively 
well known and not surprising that there is such a relationship. The econometric problem 
however, is only firstly to establish a connection, secondly and less trivially, it is to 
establish the extent to which the association represents a one-way effect and thirdly to 
attempt to quantify the strength of the connection. Consideration is given first to the 
econometric evidence that focuses on the income effect (effect (i), p.7) or time preference 
effect (effect (ii) p.7). The report then turns to experimental evidence and developmental 
approaches. 
 
3.1 Econometric evidence 
 
The best evidence for a robust effect of education on crime is provided by Lochner and 
Moretti (2001) (henceforth LM). This paper has a number of strengths described below 
Crime 
committed 
Prosecution Report to 
Police 
Arrest 
Report to 
Survey 
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but is based on US data. The best UK evidence for an effect on crime comes from 
Machin & Meghir (2000) (henceforth MM) but describes the effect of wages not of 
education per se. However, both papers develop clear theoretical foundations that support 
their estimation procedures and both papers go beyond simple Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) analysis to estimate causal relations. LM attempt Instrumental Variables (IV) 
estimation to test the robustness of the causal link. MM use a fixed effect model to 
difference out time invariant confounding factors.  
 
The LM paper is extremely useful in establishing a causal link between education and 
crime and in costing the implications. The paper also attempts a number of robustness 
checks that make the findings particularly important. However, since the paper is based 
on US data, the results are not quantitatively transferable to the UK. The following 
factors are qualitatively similar between the two countries but can be expected to diverge 
quantitatively such that empirical results would differ substantially: 
 
• the relation between schooling and the labour market. The importance in the labour 
market of high school graduation is mirrored qualitatively in the UK case in terms of 
age 16 qualifications but not quantitatively; 
• the returns to crime; 
• the probability of arrest; 
• the punishment tariff disincentive. 
 
There are also significant cultural and sociological factors relevant to the determination 
of crime that can be expected to differ substantially. This report therefore, will not exploit 
the findings of the LM paper for precise cost implications. The paper is nonetheless 
relevant and important and is described here to provide robust, empirical evidence in 
support of the hypothesis of an education-crime link. This report does, however, derive 
cost implications from the MM paper. 
 
This summary will describe the findings of these two important papers in some detail. 
Readers impatient for the key implications are invited to jump to the sections on cost 
implications. 
 
Both papers develop a standard model of economic decision-making to enable a 
consideration of the effects on crime. Individuals choose to engage in crime where the 
returns to crime, subject to the risk of punishment, outweigh the returns to legitimate 
activity. This model of rational choice is standard in economics and ignores the effect of 
changes in preferences for crime. Such preferences are likely to be important but are 
unobservable in most data sets. The advantage of the economic approach is that it enables 
one to consider the effect of what is observed within a coherent framework that 
significantly reduces the possibility of substantive bias due to the effect of unobservable 
factors. 
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Both papers use their structural models of decision-making to support an empirical 
investigation of the observed determinants of crime. Whereas LM focus on education, 
MM concentrate on wages. However, to the extent that the UK relation between 
education and wages is known, it is possible to model the implied relation between 
education and crime, disregarding general equilibrium effects and under further 
assumptions about causality and the nature of the wage-education relation described 
below. One further advantage of the LM paper is that they cost the effect of education on 
crime. MM do not. 
 
3.1.1 Lochner & Moretti 
 
3.1.1.1 Theoretical background 
 
In their theoretical model LM allow for the possibility that schooling might increase 
patience, thus increasing the anticipated cost of future punishments to criminal activity 
and so reducing crime. However, to make the model empirically tractable, LM restrict 
this possibility, making the assumption that schooling does not effect patience. The 
estimated relation, therefore, is the effect of education on crime through the effect on 
wages. To the extent that schooling also affects patience and so reduces crime, the 
estimate will be an over-estimate of the indirect, wage effect of education on crime. More 
strictly, the estimated relation is the effect on crime of the difference in wage returns to 
schooling and the crime returns. LM assume that this difference is linear in schooling, i.e. 
that schooling increases the difference in returns by the same amount at all levels of 
schooling.   
 
3.1.1.2 Data and variables 
 
LM investigate the effect of high school graduation on incarceration using US Census 
data from 1960, 1970 and 1980. The data is at the individual level but the results control 
for state and time. The time effects control for general trends in incarceration. The state 
effects reflect differences between states in the probability of punishment and the nature 
of punishment, i.e. the disincentive effect. They also report estimates controlling for age, 
state of birth, state of residence and cohort of birth. These take account of the fact, for 
example, that older males are less likely to have completed high school and less likely to 
be incarcerated, resulting in a downward bias on the estimated dropout effect on the 
probability of incarceration.  
 
Unobserved personal characteristics that increase the return to crime are likely to be 
negatively correlated with schooling since those with high criminal returns have less 
incentive to stay in school. This will mean that the effect of dropping out on crime 
estimated by regression analysis may be biased upwards, i.e. an over-estimate. LM, 
therefore, use IV estimation based on instruments that are exogenously related to 
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schooling but unrelated to crime. These are state-level changes in the minimum school 
leaving age. Since these are correlated with schooling but not with crime, they are valid 
instruments and enable LM to find the exogenous effect of schooling on crime. 
 
LM recognise incarceration is only a proxy measure of actual crime based on the links in 
Figure 2 (p. 12). If the rate of arrest or of incarceration subject to arrest vary with 
education, then a study based on incarceration data will give biased results. However, LM 
report findings that the difference in sentencing by dropout status is only of the order of 
2% - 3%, suggesting that the effect of dropout on arrest should be similar to that on 
incarceration. They also use self-reported crime evidence to argue that the effect of high 
school graduation on criminal activity is similar to that on arrest and incarceration. In 
other words, that the stages of the chain in Figure 2 do not introduce bias into their 
findings. Bias resulting from the effect of education on the probability of incarceration 
subject to arrest or arrest subject to criminal activity is minor. 
 
In order to consider the effects of education on particular types of crime, LM also turn to 
state-level FBI data. They analyse the effect of the state-level dropout rate on the arrest 
rate for particular crime types, controlling for unobserved factors through the use of state, 
year, cohort and offence type dummy variables. They show that although the arrest per 
crime rate is much higher for serious crime than for less serious crime, the correlation 
between state-level arrests and crimes is extremely high (above 0.95 for most crime 
types). This suggests that state-level variation in arrests is a good proxy for state-level 
variation in crimes.   
 
3.1.1.3 Results 
 
LM find that once year, age and state of birth effects are included in the specification, 
high school drop-out increases the probability of incarceration by 0.72 - 0.78 percentage 
points for white males and 3.2 - 3.6 percentage points for black males4. These results are 
from OLS regression analysis but LM find that IV results are quantitatively similar.  
 
Table 1 shows the effect of dropout on particular crime types resulting from LM’s 
analysis of state-level FBI data. For example, based on a 90% confidence interval, a 10 
percentage point rise in the graduation rate would cut the murder arrest rate by 14 and 
27% (the point estimate of 21% is shown in Table 1). The strongest effects are on 
murder, assault and vehicle crime. The effects on murder and assault mitigate against an 
interpretation of an income effect to the extent that, as MM argue (see below), violent 
crime is less well explained by economic incentives than other forms of crime. To some 
extent this suggests that the schooling variable is picking up effects of peer groups and 
life-styles resulting from the non-completion of high school rather than the direct effect 
                                                 
4 As elsewhere in this report, a 90% confidence interval is reported. The point estimates are 0.75 and 3, 4 
respectively, the standard errors are 0.02 and 0.11 
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of the missed learning. The result is also compatible, however, with the hypothesis that 
the effect of schooling is through increasing the opportunity cost of prison sentences 
since these are particularly high for violent crimes.   
 
The authors tentatively suggest that the apparent positive effect of high school graduation 
on rape may occur because less educated women are less likely to put forward rape 
charges. 
 
Table 1: Effect of a 1 percentage point increase in the state-level high school completion 
rate on the arrest rate (% effect) and resulting social benefit 
 
 Estimated effect 
 
(1) 
Social cost per 
crime, $000 
(2) 
Social benefit, $ million 
 
(3) 
 % s.e.  Lower Upper
Murder -2.1 0.4 3,024 777.5 1481.7
Rape 1.0 0.4 89 -216.3 -61.9
Robbery 0.1 0.3 9 -50.4 33.2
Assault -2.2 0.3 10 277.4 459.2
Burglary -0.3 0.3 1 -12.0 30.6
Larceny -0.3 0.3 0.2 -5.9 19.7
Vehicle -1.3 0.3 1 9.7 25.7
Arson -7.8 0.4 39 2.6 34.0
 
Note: Results indicate the percentage effect (relative effect, not percentage point effect) on the crime rate of 
a 1 percentage point fall in the dropout rate. 
Column (1): LM, Table 10. Results from OLS regressions controlling for effects of age x offence, offence 
x year, age x year, state x age, state x offence and state x year.  
Column (2): LM, Table 13, based on victim costs (including property loss) and incarceration loss. 
Column (3): Based on 90% confidence interval. 
 
3.1.1.4 Cost implications 
 
It is important to note that the study focuses on the effect on crime of educational failure. 
LM note that the raw incarceration rate for all males in the 1980 Census was 0.4% for 
high school graduates but 1.5% for drop-outs, i.e. nearly 4 times higher. For black, male 
high school drop-outs the incarceration rate was 4.1% as opposed to 2% for black, male 
high school graduates. This jump is substantially greater than that associated with any 
other failed schooling progression. For example, the increase in crime associated with 
failing to move from 11 to 12 years of school (graduating from high school) is 3 times 
larger than that associated with failing to move from 10 to 11 years. This suggests 
something analogous to a sheepskin effect for crime, i.e. that the effect of schooling on 
crime is not linear but related to receipt or otherwise of key diplomas.  
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To convert the estimates to social costs it is necessary to weight the figures by the current 
arrest rates for each crime type and weight up to deal with the attenuation resulting from 
deviation of the arrest rate from the crime rate. This gives an estimated change in crime 
numbers resulting from a 1 percentage point increase in the drop out rate. Based on US 
crime and arrest rates LM estimates give a reduction in crime of between 94,310 
offences, with a social benefit of $1.4 billion. However, this includes effects that are not 
precisely estimated and statistically insignificant. Therefore, put in terms of a 90% 
confidence interval this represents a reduction in crime of between -14,000 and 225,000 
offences5 with a social benefit of between $0.8 billion and $2.0 billion. 
 
If one rejects estimated effects on crime types that are not statistically significant at 90%, 
i.e. those on robbery, burglary and larceny/theft, the reduction in crime is between 34,000 
and 68,000 offences with a social benefit of between $0.9 billion and $1.9 billion. 
Roughly 80% of this effect is caused by effects on murder, which is more prevalent in the 
US than UK so the effects are clearly not directly transferable. They are, however, 
indicative. 
 
Furthermore, the strong effect on violent as opposed to property crime runs slightly 
counter to their model since one might expect educational effects through wages to be 
more likely in property crime. However, if failure to graduate from high school puts you 
into poor peer groups (gangs) then, in the US, the big effect may be expected on violent 
crime. This is IV analysis where graduation is instrumented by state level changes in 
minimum leaving age legislation and the results condition for state and time effects plus 
interactions but it does not follow that all of the effect of non-graduation is through the 
wage. 
 
These social benefit figures include victim costs (productivity and wage costs, medical 
costs and quality of life costs based on jury awards in civil actions) and property loss 
figures from Miller et al. (1996) and incarceration costs from Stephen (1999). They are 
therefore, under-estimates since they omit some aspects of the costs of crime such as 
private security measures, law enforcement and judicial costs. They also omit some kinds 
of crime, notably drug related crime, which cost over $5 billion in terms of incarceration 
alone in 1991 (Lynch et al., 1984).  
 
The LM results translate to an annual social benefit of $1,170-$2,100 per additional male 
high school graduate (depending on which estimates are used), 14% - 26% of the private 
benefit and comparing to a one-off direct cost of $6,000.  
                                                 
5 The estimated effect on numbers of crimes is given in LM, Table 13, column 6. These are re-evaluated for 
coefficients two standard errors either side of the LM point estimates to give unreported 90% confidence 
interval limits for the change in numbers of offences for each crime type.  The re-aggregated figure is 
reported in the text above. 
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3.1.2 Machin & Meghir 
 
3.1.2.1 Theoretical background 
 
The rational model of crime determination is applied by MM to property crime only and 
not to violent crime, which the authors believe may be less well explained by economic 
incentives. 
 
In the rational model of crime determination, education pushes up the returns to 
legitimate activity and so reduces the likelihood of individuals engaging in crime. MM 
argue that it is more sensible to analyse the effects of wages on crime than of 
unemployment on crime because many individuals engage in both work and crime. 
Wages, therefore, better reflect the incentives available in the labour market. Against this 
it might be argued that time spent in legitimate labour market activity is not really traded 
off against time spent in crime since most crimes do not take long to plan or execute and 
can in any case be committed outside working hours! Nonetheless, it might still be argued 
that the opportunity cost of crime includes the risk of punishment and since this rises with 
the wage, higher wages will reduce crime. 
 
3.1.2.2 Data, variables and method 
 
The MM study is based on area level crime data for the 43 police force areas of England 
and Wales (excluding the City of London), 1975-1996. This is matched to earnings data 
from the New Earnings Survey. In order to estimate the effect of the right wage signal on 
the decisions of labour market participants and those potentially engaged in crime, MM 
look at the effect of the 25th percentile of the wage distribution on crime. This is 
considered to be the closest single measure of the possible wages available to those 
choosing between different combinations of crime and legitimate work. Experiments with 
other measures of the wage distribution or of the distribution of wages available to 
workers in particular sectors demonstrate that the results do not depend excessively on 
the measure chosen.  
 
In their regression analysis, MM control for the proportion of young people in the 
population, a measure of the conviction rate and include area and year fixed effects. This 
fixed effects method means that the resulting coefficients can be seen as assessing the 
effect of a change in wages in a particular area and year on the change in the level of 
crime in that area. In addition, the analysis controls for the changing likelihood of 
conviction and the changing proportion of young people in the population. Further 
experiments control for the lagged value of the crime rate, to control for peer group 
effects and to deal with the negative, reverse causality that if crime rates go up ceteris 
paribus conviction rates fall. IV is also used as an alternative method for dealing with this 
problem.   
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It should be emphasised that there are many advantages to this fixed effects method in 
which estimation is based on the effects of the change in wages on the change in crime. It 
means, in particular, that it is substantially less likely that the wage effect erroneously 
picks up other factors that are correlated with the wage and with crime such as 
neighbourhood deprivation, family breakdown and other associated cultural and 
demographic factors. Essentially, this method removes the effect of any variables that are 
constant year on year. The wage moves in tandem with the business cycle but the cultural 
factors mentioned move much more slowly and the correlation between the change in any 
of these cultural variables and the change in the wage is much less than the correlation 
between the level values. The bias of confounding factors is therefore substantially 
reduced. 
 
3.1.2.3 Results 
 
In their preferred specification, MM find that a 10% higher 25th percentile area wage rate 
reduces the overall area property crime rate by 0.8 percentage points6. In all 
specifications, this marginal effect varies between 0.7 and 1.0 percentage points. Using 
the 25th percentile wage for retail trade workers as the wage variable produces slightly 
lower results (down to 0.6 percentage points) but this is not a better specification in that 
the alternative wage variables represent the incentives available for a smaller proportion 
of the population. This result does, however, indicate that the key findings are robust to 
the choice of wage variable. MM also develop a specification to take account of the effect 
of compositional changes in the labour force on the results. These estimates provide a 
lower bound for the wage effect on crime of 0.4 percentage points. These estimates are 
not preferred since they rest on the extreme assumption that all non-workers have lower 
wage rates than those working and are intended as robustness checks.   
 
Breaking overall property crime rates down into the sub-categories of property crime, the 
point estimate effects are as shown in Table 2. A 10% increase in the 25th percentile wage 
will reduce the vehicle crime rate by 4.8 percentage points, the theft and handling rate by 
0.4 and the burglary rate by 0.18. All effects are strongly statistically significant.  
 
                                                 
6 This is based on a co-efficient of -1.506 in a logistic model. A 90% confidence interval gives a range of 
[1.24, 1.77]. Using information on average property crime rate convictions supplied by Steve Gibbons 
and gratefully received, it can be reported that this transforms to a marginal effect range between 0.67 and 
0.95 points. 
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Table 2. Marginal effect of a 10% increase in the 25th percentile wage on the crime rate, 
percentage points 
 
 All property 
crime 
Vehicle crime Theft and 
handling 
Burglary 
Effect  -0.81 -0.48 -0.40 -0.18 
 
Source: MM. 
Note: see Table 3 (p.22) for confidence interval for effect on ‘all property crime’.  
 
3.1.2.4 Cost implications 
 
As with LM, MM focus on the effect on crime of educational failure. MM choose the 25th 
percentile of the wage distribution as their measure of the wage incentive facing potential 
criminals because they consider the low end of the wage distribution to be the relevant 
signal. Although they do not observe the educational level of potential criminals, they 
assume that it is low and so the wage possibilities of legitimate work for potential 
criminals are also low. In fact, MM get quantitatively similar results with the 10th 
percentile, suggesting that the incentive effect of wages on crime is indeed felt at the low 
end of the joint distribution of wages, education and skills. 
 
Consider now the conversion of these estimates into the social benefit of the effect of 
wages on crime. The first issue is the implication of the MM estimates for the numbers of 
crimes committed in each of the categories. Since the MM estimation gives the average 
effect of a change in the wage distribution on the recorded crime rate between 1975 and 
1997, consider the benefit in terms of the average numbers of crime committed over that 
period. The first step, shown in column (1) of Table 3, is to show the average number of 
crimes in each of the MM categories7. The reduction in crime resulting from the effect of 
a 10% rise in the 25th percentile of the wage distribution is shown in column (2). These 
are then factored up in column (3) to take account of the fact that many crimes go 
unreported. These multiplying factors differ by type of crime and are described in the 
notes to the table. For example, it can be seen that a 10% increase in the 25th percentile 
wage would reduce the number of recorded property crimes by over 400,000. Using the 
weighted multipliers derived by Brand and Price, the reduction in actual property crimes 
is estimated to be over three times larger at over 1,300,0008.  
 
                                                 
7 Note that total property crime on the MM definition excludes criminal damage, fraud and forgery, which 
between them account for 31% of recorded property crime in the official definition. Theft and handling 
includes the sub-category of vehicle crime.  Other definitions are given in the notes to Table 3. 
8 Brand & Price (2000) give multipliers for each of the official sub-categories of crime. The sub-categories 
are factored up by their crime-specific multiplier and then calculated to a total property crime multiplier 
of 3.25. 
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Column (4) then gives the estimated cost of each incident based on the Home Office 
Research Survey (Brand and Price, 2000), which estimates that the total cost of crime in 
England and Wales in 1999/2000 was £60 billion. It is worth pointing out that that study 
was not able to estimate the cost effects of the fear of crime, the effect on victims’ 
families or inter-generational effects. Included costs are those due to the anticipation of 
crime (security and insurance administration), as a consequence of criminal activity 
(loss/damage to property, emotional and physical impact) and in costs to the criminal 
justice system. Of the £60 billion annual cost, burglary accounts for 8%, vehicle crime, 
7% and non-vehicle theft and handling, 7%. Thus total property crime in the MM 
definition, i.e. excluding fraud and forgery and criminal damage, accounts for 22% of the 
total cost of crime. What the overall benefits of education would be if all kinds of crime 
responded to wage changes in the way estimated by MM is considered below. 
 
Based on the Brand and Price figures the overall effect of the change in the wage 
distribution is given in column (5) and would be between £1.3 billion and £1.8 billion in 
an average year over the period. This is an under-estimate of the total crime effect since it 
only includes effects on property crime and only on the costs estimated by Brand and 
Price. 
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Now factor in the effect of education on the wage based on estimates of the relation 
between area (county) education levels and area wages from the 2000 Labour Force 
Survey. Conditions are made for the area age distribution and industrial structure since in 
the short-run this is given regardless of the effect of any additional educational 
achievement.  
 
The full regression results are shown in Appendix 1, and demonstrate how county-level 
wages vary with the proportion of an area with different highest academic and vocational 
qualifications. The tables in Appendix 1 show the results under a number of different 
specifications, based on different sub-samples and for different academic and vocational 
training effects but the results in column 1 of Appendix 1 are most pertinent to the current 
costing exercise. They show the effects of a change in the proportion with qualifications 
at different levels on the log of the 25th percentile of the wage for all workers, the wage 
distribution variable used by MM. This leads to an estimate of the elasticity of wages 
with respect to academic and vocational qualifications9. This can then be linked to the 
MM estimate of the elasticity of crime with respect to wages to give a figure for the 
responsiveness of crime with respect to qualifications. The key coefficients are shown in 
Table 4 (p. 25). 
 
Disregarding for a moment the important assumptions required, interpretation is as 
follows: The coefficient for the proportion with A Levels ranges with 90% confidence 
between 0.63 and 2.65. Taking the lower limit, this means that if the proportion of the 
population with A Levels rises by 0.1, the log of the 25th percentile of the hourly wage 
will rise by between 0.063, an increase in the 25th percentile of 6.3%. This suggests that a 
10% increase in the 25th percentile would require an increase in the proportion with 
degrees of 0.16, at the lower limit. As column 2 indicates, the implication is that a 16 
percentage point increase in the proportion of the population with degrees would increase 
the 25th percentile of the wage distribution by 10%, reduce total property crime by 0.8 
percentage points and produce £1.3 billion of savings in wider benefits of learning, at the 
lower limit MM estimate. Columns 3 and 4 show the savings in terms of the costs of 
property crime of 1 and 5 percentage point increases in educational levels. 
 
At the lower end of confidence limits, a 1 point increase in the proportion with A Levels 
is predicted to create benefits of £80 million in reduced property crime. At the upper end 
of the confidence limits, the benefit would be £500 million. The range is large because 
two sets of confidence limits have been factored in, those of roughly 20% around the MM 
estimated crime saving and margins of error of between 24% and 53% around the 
education effect coefficients, disregarding the limit on ‘under O Level’ effect. The 
combination makes for a large degree of imprecision.  
 
 
                                                 
9 See Appendix 3 for a precise description of education and training classifications used. 
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It is important to note that the education variables are the proportion in the county with 
the highest qualification as specified. The specified effects in Columns 3 and 4, therefore, 
are based on a ceteris paribus assumption. For example, consider the increase in degree 
proportion described above. In order for the full effect to be gained it is necessary to 
assume that all the new degree holders had moved from the no qualifications category. If 
the new degrees had come from the A Level category then just as the degree proportion 
goes up producing the described effect, so the A Level proportion goes down, producing 
an offsetting effect unless there is also the appropriate increase in the proportion moving 
from O Level to A Level and from no qualifications to O Level. 
 
Note, too, that the main effects come from higher level qualifications and that negligible, 
insignificant but wrong-signed changes in the wage distribution are brought about by 
increases in the proportions with below O Level qualifications. The implication is that, 
although it is those with low qualifications who are thought to be most influenced by the 
crime/work trade-off, small increases in human capital are unlikely to be sufficient to 
induce much effect on that choice. 
 
Effects of increases below O Level are trivial but it is estimated that a 5 percentage point 
increase in the proportion of the area population with O Level or equivalent qualifications 
will produce a reduction in crime with a benefit of up to £1.6 billion per year. In these 
data, 23% are without O Level or equivalent so the associated policy choice is to reduce 
that figure to 18%.  
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Table 4: Relation between area-level education and the log of the 25th percentile of the 
wage, England & Wales, 2000, implications for social benefits. 
 
  
 
 
Implied saving from an increase 
in the proportion with education 
level, £ million: 
 
 
 
 
Estimated 
coefficients of 
the effect of 
educational 
level on wages 
(1) 
Percentage 
point increase 
in 
qualifications 
required for a 
10% increase 
in 25th 
percentile 
(2) 
1 point 
(3) 
5 points 
(4) 
 Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Degree 
0.959 2.427 10.4 4.1 118.9 460.8 594.4 2,304.1 
A Level 0.633 2.649 15.8 3.8 78.5 502.9 392.3 2,514.7 
O Level 0.105 1.673 95.0 6.0 13.0 317.6 65.2 1,587.9 
Under O 
Level -0.796 0.388 -12.6 25.7 -98.7 73.7 -493.7 368.6 
 
Note: Those with no qualifications are the default group. Education variables are the proportion in each 
county with highest qualification as specified, see Appendix 3 for more information. To achieve the 
specified effects, therefore, it is necessary to assume that all new members of the category have moved 
from the no qualifications group or that offsetting increases have been established all down the line. 
Column (1): Lower and upper bounds are based on 90% confidence limits from regression in column 1 of 
Appendix 1, a regression of county level wages on education, age structure and industry structure, 2000. 
See Appendix 1 for full details.   
Column (2): This is calculated as 10 x reciprocal of coefficient from column 1. This gives the change in the 
proportion with qualifications required for a 10% increase in the 25th percentile of the wage, with resulting 
£1.3 - £1.8 billion estimated saving.  
Column (3): Lower limit based on lower limit of education effect in column 2 and lower limit of crime 
effect from Table 3, i.e. calculated as £1.3 billion / lower limit in column 2. Upper limit based on upper 
limits in both cases, i.e. £1.8 billion / upper limit in column 2. 
Column (4): This is calculated as 5 x column 3. 
 
The assumptions underlying these conclusions are described shortly. Accepting the 
uncertainty in the exercise and the inherently ad hoc nature of decisions about confidence 
interval limits, the results in Table 4 represent an informed guess at the social benefits of 
education in reducing property crime, through the wage channel. Thus: 
 
• The benefit from a 1 point increase in the proportion of the working age area 
population with O Level or equivalent qualifications, is predicted to lie between £10 
million and £320 million. 
• The benefit if 1 percentage point of those in the area population with O Levels, 
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reached A Level or equivalent qualifications and those with O Levels or equivalent 
who progressed were replaced by those who had previously had no qualifications, is 
predicted to lie between £80 million and £500 million. 
 
3.1.2.5 Assumptions 
 
Underlying these results is the assumption that the estimation procedure has accurately 
identified ‘effects’. It has been assumed that there are no confounding factors picked up 
by the education variables but in these simple models that is not a trivial assumption. For 
example, it may be that areas with high levels of qualifications also have infrastructures 
and cultures that are supportive of the creation of high returns to qualifications. 
Increasing the level of education in Merseyside to that in Hertfordshire is unlikely by 
itself to create the same returns to education unless the possibilities of the London labour 
market were made equally available. Thus, although controls are given for the industrial 
structure10 and age structure of the county, it is likely that there are a number of 
confounding factors that bias the estimate of the education elasticity.  
 
This bias could go either way. It may be that interventions to increase education in the 
way described will not have the predicted effect because low education county 
populations have worse risk factors than those with high education levels. Or, again, it 
may be that the returns to educational interventions are higher at the bottom end.  
 
Similarly, it is also assumed that effects are linear i.e., the effect of a 10 percentage point 
increase is 10 times greater than the effect of a 1 point increase. This is a strong 
assumption and it may be expected that as increases in the numbers with qualifications 
get larger, the wage benefits will decline because of over-skilling and because less 
productive individuals are being educated. Against this, however, one might point to the 
fact that the returns to education are higher for those with less education. Increasing 
education at the county level might initiate a virtuous circle of positive externalities in 
terms of skills, enterprise, job creation, investment and growth that make the estimated 
elasticity an under-estimate in the long-run. It is also assumed that there are no general 
equilibrium effects. This is similar to the previous point. 
 
Finally, it is pointed out that a more rounded study would consider the relation between 
qualifications and wages over the period 1975-1997 since that is the period over which 
the crime effects of wages were estimated. However, that would require a very 
substantial coding exercise in the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and would require 
considerably longer than is possible for this report. Further error is nonetheless 
introduced by this simplification. 
 
                                                 
10 Industrial structure coefficients are not reported. 
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3.1.2.6 Conclusions 
 
Based on the analysis described above, there is clear evidence of substantial wider 
benefits of learning through wage effects on the reduction of crime. The channel is the 
incentives available to those choosing between crime and legitimate labour market 
activity and the inhibitive effect of time out of the labour market if caught. Evidence 
comes from the relation between year on year changes in wages in each area on the 
change in area crime rate. The suggestion is that there are substantial savings to be made. 
Taking 1% of the working age population from no qualifications or low qualifications to 
the achievement of 1 O Level would reduce the costs of property crime by between £10 
million and £320 million per year. If those same people were taken to A Level or 
equivalent, the saving would be between £80 million and £500 million. 
 
Given the importance of the young in committing crime, it would be interesting to see 
how these results change if analysis focuses solely on the wages of youth and young 
males in particular. That analysis is beyond the scope of this report but Appendices 1 and 
2 report results of wage regressions for males and young males. It can be seen, for 
example that the wage effects of education for male workers (column 2, Appendix 2) are 
much stronger than the effects reported above. One would need to know the 
responsiveness of male crime to male wages to know precisely what this implied for the 
education-crime link but subsequent work could profitably focus on this issue. 
 
To now return to the Brand and Price (2000) estimate that the total cost of crime in 
England and Wales in 1999/2000 was £60 billion of which total property crime 
contributed 22%. The MM estimates suggest that if all crime was as responsive to wage 
changes as property crime, the effects would be nearly 3 times as large, an actual ratio of 
2.7. Factoring up the results of Table 4 would produce even larger benefits but would 
require the assumption that the effects are equal for all forms of crime. This may not be 
so strong an assumption if LM are right that educational failure has an even stronger 
effect on violent crime than on property crime. However, we are not in a position to test 
this assumption for the UK. It should also be noted, that even the £60 billion total cost 
estimated by Brand and Price excludes drug trafficking and possession, handling stolen 
goods, public order offences, low level disorder, fare evasion and motoring offences. 
They also exclude the wider effects of crime such as economic distortions.  
 
3.2 Chronic offenders and the developmental perspective 
 
An alternative to the econometric approach to costing the wider benefits of learning 
comes from the developmental tradition, as represented in the arena of crime by the work 
of David Farrington and John Laub. As stated above, a key finding of this literature is 
that in the UK there are 100,000 offenders who account for half of all crime. If education 
could affect the incidence of crime by this group, then the overall cost of crime would be 
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substantially reduced. Against this, however, is the idea that these offenders are 
particularly insensitive to education interventions and that policy would be better targeted 
on the rest of the population who commit the other 50% of crime. 
 
Unfortunately, there is as yet no hard evidence about the relative effectiveness of 
mainstream educational interventions on these two groups. Blumstein et al. (1985) 
consider recidivism probabilities and find a significant demarcation between those with 6 
or more arrests by age 18 and those with fewer than 6. In other words, the former group 
represent the ‘chronic persisters’ who have high recidivism rates while those with more 
than 3 arrests can be thought of as ‘mild persisters’, for whom recidivism is more likely 
than for non-offenders but less likely than for chronic persisters. However, the key 
distinction between chronic and mild offenders is the age of first conviction which is not 
an obvious policy variable and there is no evidence in the paper about the relative levels 
of educational failure of the two groups. 
 
In other evidence, Farrington (1999) makes a distinction between ‘delinquents’ with 1 or 
more offence, and ‘persisters’ with 3 or more convictions. Significant differences are 
observed between these two groups in terms of family income and social class, the level 
of involvement of the father, other delinquency in the family and concentration and 
troublemaking in school. For example, whereas 15% of non-offenders in the Cambridge 
Study were rated as troublesome by teachers, 29% of occasional offenders and 64% of 
persistent offenders were so rated. This shows a clear relation between troublemaking 
and both delinquency and the level of delinquency. 
 
Unfortunately, although this evidence is useful in pointing to the ability of risk factors to 
indicate and predict persistent offending, there are no clear implications about the 
effectiveness of learning interventions. It is clear that school and schooling is important 
but the causal processes are extremely unclear. The recent Home Office report on Youth 
Crime (Flood-Page et al., 2000) finds that 12-16 year old boys (Youth Lifestyles Survey, 
1998/9) who did not like school were 3 times more likely to offend (31%) than those who 
liked school (9%). 18 to 30 year olds were 4 times more likely to be persistent offenders 
than those with some qualifications. Unfortunately for the purposes of this analysis, the 
report does not give an equivalent figure for non-serious offenders, without which it is 
not possible to evaluate the relative importance of qualifications for persistent and non-
persistent offenders. This is postponed to future research.  
 
Moreover, without longitudinal data with sufficient wealth of information to observe 
changes in the degree of attachment to school claims about the causal pattern are in any 
case prone to substantial bias. Those with a tendency to commit crime are likely to have 
reduced attachment to school for any number of reasons. Although one may wish to draw 
the policy conclusion that increasing attachment to school will reduce crime, there is 
insufficient evidence to support this conclusion and, more importantly, there is no 
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indication about how to achieve it or what the relation is between the degree of change 
and the level of criminality. 
 
3.2.1 Experimental studies, including pre-school and parenting 
programmes 
 
As stated above, a key issue is the establishment of effects. An important and relevant 
body of evidence is provided by the literature on the evaluation of experimental studies of 
crime reduction since, under standard conditions, experiments can provide extremely 
robust evidence of effects. However, experiments are commonly conducted on small 
samples and it is important that results are replicated in order to be sure that one can 
generalise from results.  
 
An equally important issue for policy is the scaling-up problem. It is relatively easy to 
create benefits in a small-scale intervention with high-quality, motivated and possible 
self-interested staff, much harder to recreate such success on a national scale with much 
greater variation in quality and more complex monitoring and dissemination 
requirements. Shadish et al. (2002) draw a distinction between ‘efficacy trials’ which 
evaluate small-scale interventions, often with much higher budgets than what is plausible 
for scaled up programmes and commonly find positive benefits and ‘effectiveness trials’, 
in which interventions are tested in more realistic contexts. Unfortunately, the former are 
far more common and are referred to more often in presentation of the experimental 
evidence. This is true also for the evaluation evidence of programmes to reduce crime. 
 
Table 5 (p. 30) is taken from the review of experimental evidence on delinquency 
prevention conducted by Farrington and Welsh (1999). This is efficacy evaluation in the 
sense described above but does indicate that well-funded and targeted programmes can be 
successful. 
 
It is noted that all of these evaluations were based on randomised or matched trials, were 
peer-reviewed and had initial treatment samples of at least 50. Many of these 
programmes were successful but some were not and there is insufficient evidence on why 
this is so. Nonetheless, programmes based on home visiting, day care, pre-school, school-
based, clinic and multi-systemic treatment have all been demonstrated to reduce 
criminality, anti-social behaviour and delinquency. For example, the Montreal 
Longitudinal Experimental Study identified 366 aggressive and/or hyperactive 6 year 
olds and initiated a programme of school-based training in social skills and self-control. 
Small group sessions worked on issues such as ‘what to do when you’re angry’ and 
parents received training in consistency of child management. Statistically significant 
delinquency differences were recorded between control and treatment groups for every 
age between 10 and 15. The children were at risk of becoming offenders but their 
delinquency rates were nonetheless appreciably reduced.  
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Another example of a school-age experimental design is the Quantum Opportunities 
Program (QOP), a US youth development program designed to serve disadvantaged 
adolescents by providing education, service, and development activities, as well as 
financial incentives, over a 4 year period, from 9th grade until high school graduation. An 
evaluation which compared QOP participants to a control group demonstrated that QOP 
members were both more likely to be high school graduates (63% of QOP members 
graduated high school compared to 42% of the control group) and less likely to be 
arrested (19% of QOP members compared to 23% of the control group). The economic 
return is estimated at 3.68 units per unit of monetary investment (Nuttall et al., 1998, 
Table 2.1). 
 
Future work will be able consider the strength of this evidence and the size and range of 
effects but that has not been possible for this report. Furthermore, although these trials 
have demonstrated effects for children with a high risk of becoming persistent offenders 
as well as for more general populations, they have not distinguished the two groups. 
There is, therefore, as yet no available evidence to test the hypothesis of the relative 
benefits of programmes that target persistent offenders and those that target less 
persistent offenders. 
 
3.2.2 Adult interventions and basic skills 
 
As explained in the introduction, this report is concerned not just with the association of 
academic qualifications and crime but also with all aspects of learning through the life 
cycle. For example, Vennard et al. (1997) report meta-analytic results that programmes of 
cognitive-behavioural treatment with offenders reduces recidivism by 20 percentage 
points relative to control groups. The social benefits are likely to be considerable but this 
evidence also suggests that well-focused post-school learning interventions can reduce 
crime. 
 
The Home Office report on Youth Crime (Flood-Page et al., 2000) described above, finds 
that disaffection with school is strongly linked to offending. Poor acquisition of the basic 
skills of literacy and numeracy often underlies the school problem. The British 
Government’s Basic Skills Agency (BSA) has carried out surveys of different sections of 
the population including one involving 414 inmates in 16 prisons (BSA, 1994) and a 
major prison ‘literacy screening’ exercise involving 28,695 prisoners. These have 
involved assessments of functional literacy and numeracy, measured against national 
standards: Foundation; Level 1; Level 2; Level 3 for literacy, and Foundation; Level 1; 
Level 2 for numeracy11. The tests used require respondents to carry out every day tasks, 
such as extracting information from ‘Yellow Pages’ or working out change in a shop. The 
tasks are set at different levels of difficulty corresponding to the national standards. 
                                                 
11  Broadly, Level 2 is the equivalent of the British GCSE, standard or O Level; Level 3 approaches the 
British A Level.   
  32
Overall scores are obtained from performance across all the tasks. 
 
Overall the percentage of prisoners with poor basic skills as assessed by such tests was 
substantially higher than for other sections of the population. More prisoners had failed to 
achieve Level 1 (53%) – 3 times the proportions for adults generally and 10 times the 
proportion for college students. For numeracy these differences were not apparent. Much 
the same (high) proportion, one half prisoners, as in the adult population, had failed to 
achieve level 1 numeracy – about 3 times the proportion in the college sample. In the 
more recent 1997 screening exercise the prevalence of poor literacy skills in prisons was 
lower but was still substantially above that of the adult population. 
 
An intervention in Canada attempted to break the link between poor basic skills and 
offending directly in the prison setting. Porporino and Robinson (1992) investigated the 
effect on recidivism of basic skills teaching directed at prisoners diagnosed as having low 
basic skills and found that 30% of those who completed the programme (i.e. achieved 
grade 8) returned to prison compared with 36% of those who started the programme, but 
did not complete it, and 42% of those who had withdrawn from it. The largest reductions 
in recidivism were for young offenders and for violent offenders followed by longer 
sentence offenders12.   
 
It is not clear that these associations of recidivism and completion of the course are 
causal. It is possible that completion is a marker for the intentions of prisoners but, 
nonetheless, the Canadian study is part of a body of evidence pointing to the importance 
of basic education in the rehabilitation of offenders (Home Office, 1997). As many 
studies have shown, one of the most effective means of combating crime is through the 
provision of employment opportunities for people leaving prison (Nuttall et al., 1998). 
The stigma of prisoner status puts off many potential employers. When lacking basic 
skills the ex prisoner is doubly disadvantaged. Such problems are compounded in a 
changing labour market, where unskilled manual work has dramatically declined and ever 
more emphasis is placed on qualifications and certification. 
 
                                                 
12  Thus there were only 31% recidivists among the young offenders who had completed the training 
compared with half of those who had withdrawn from the course. In the case of violent offenders the 
figures were 28% (completed) compared with 47% (withdrawn). For longer sentence offenders the 
figures were 24% (completed) compared with 39% (withdrawn). 
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
This report represents an attempt to begin to get to grips with the immensely wide-
ranging and substantial wider benefits of learning. The Centre for Research on the Wider 
Benefits of Learning, together with the Department for Education and Skills (DfES), has 
identified crime, health, ageing, parenting and social cohesion as key areas in which 
wider benefits are likely to be particularly important and to have costable implications for 
the UK tax-payer, as well as being important in personal terms. 
 
This report has attempted to show that the wider crime benefits of learning are substantial 
and approachable statistically. Yet there are still major doubts and uncertainties. The 
estimates presented in this report need to be read with considerable caution and to be seen 
as indicative only.  
 
The wider benefits have been approached quantitatively in this report but the Centre for 
Research on the Wider Benefits of Learning has also been running a programme of 
qualitative work to understand in much more detail the causal mechanisms and mediating 
processes that bear on the wider benefits of learning throughout the life course. Among 
other things, that programme will have important results for how the Centre approaches 
these issues quantitatively. It will help in establishing the theoretical basis for the effects 
demonstrated in this report. This is important because, in a multi-disciplinary area of this 
kind, theoretical explanations are still relatively weak.  
 
This report is, therefore, a first step in the wider benefits programme. In future the Centre 
will draw on wider data, develop the theoretical implications of the qualitative 
programme and draw more strongly from the wider research community. 
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Appendix 1: Relation between area-level education and training 
qualifications the log of the 25th percentile of the wage, England 
& Wales, 2000 
 
 All FT workers      
 
 
 
 
 
        (1) 
All Men (dependent 
variable is the log of 
the 25th percentile of 
Male Wage 
Distribution)  
 
        (2) 
Men aged 16-24 
(dependent variable is 
the log of the 25th 
percentile of Young 
Male Wage 
Distribution)   
       (3) 
Degree 1.693 1.759 0.848 
 (0.445) (0.332) (0.671) 
A Level 1.641 2.104 1.026 
 (0.611) (0.384) (0.345) 
O Level 0.889 1.088 0.226 
 (0.475) (0.287) (0.272) 
Under O Level -0.204 0.394 0.888 
 (0.359) (0.314) (0.153) 
Age 25 to 34 0.041 1.341  
 (0.362) (0.385)  
Age 35 to 49 0.392 1.173  
 (0.429) (0.388)  
Age 50 to 65 0.518 1.586  
 (0.450) (0.488)  
Female -0.183   
 (0.265)   
Observations 57 57 57 
R-squared 0.81 0.83 0.78 
 
Notes: 
1. Qualifications defined as in Appendix 3. 
2.  Weighted least squares regression, where the weights are the inverse of the number of 
observations in each county. 
3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
4. Significant at 5%; significant at 1% 
5.  For further detail on educational definitions see Appendix 3. 
6.  Industry controls also included (0=agriculture, forestry, fishing; 1= energy & water supply; 2= 
minerals, ores, metals, chemicals; 3= metal goods, engineering, vehicles; 4= other manufacturing 
industries; 5= construction; 6= distribution, hotels & catering, repair; 7= transport and 
communication; 8= banking, financial & business services; 9= other services). 
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Appendix 2: Relation between area-level education qualifications 
and the log of the 25th percentile of the wage, England & Wales, 
2000 
 
 All FT workers 
 
 
 
 
 
       (1) 
All Men (dependent 
variable is the log of 
the 25th percentile of 
Male Wage 
Distribution) 
 
         (2) 
Men aged 16-24  
(dependent variable is 
the log of the 25th 
percentile of Young 
Male Wage 
Distribution) 
          (3) 
Degree 1.486 1.569 0.966 
 (0.479) (0.406) (0.759) 
Higher 1.622 2.113 1.117 
 (0.614) (0.507) (0.399) 
A Level 0.867 1.234 0.627 
 (0.486) (0.360) (0.283) 
GCSE A-C 0.981 0.718 0.150 
 (0.526) (0.467) (0.315) 
Other quals. -0.060 0.413 1.278 
 (0.373) (0.420) (0.394) 
Age 25 to 34 0.060 0.950  
 (0.331) (0.424)  
Age 35 to 49 0.224 0.678  
 (0.360) (0.435)  
Age 50 to 65 0.339 1.054  
 (0.442) (0.545)  
Female -0.473   
 (0.355)   
Observations 57 57 57 
R-squared 0.80 0.82 0.78 
 
Notes: 
1. Weighted least squares regression, where the weights are the inverse of the number of 
observations in each county. 
2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
3. Significant at 5%; significant at 1%. 
4.  For further detail on educational definitions see appendix 1. 
5.  Industry controls also included (0=agriculture, forestry, fishing; 1= energy & water supply; 2= 
minerals, ores, metals, chemicals; 3= metal goods, engineering, vehicles; 4= other manufacturing 
industries; 5= construction; 6= distribution, hotels & catering, repair; 7= transport and 
communication; 8= banking, financial & business services; 9= other services). 
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Appendix 3: Classification of academic and vocational 
qualifications used in Appendix 1 
 
Degree 
Higher degree  
NVQ Level 5  
First degree  
Other degree 
 
A Level and above 
NVQ Level 4  
Diploma in Higher Education  
HNC, HND, BTEC, etc, Higher  
Teaching, further education  
Teaching, secondary education  
Teaching, primary education  
Teaching, Level not stated  
Nursing etc  
RSA Higher Diploma  
Other Higher Education below degree
  
NVQ Level 3  
GNVQ Advanced  
A Level or equivalent  
 
O Level and above: 
RSA Advanced Diploma  
OND, ONC, BTEC etc, National  
City & Guilds Advanced Craft  
Scottish CSYs  
SCE Higher or equivalent  
AS Level or equivalent  
Trade Apprenticeship  
NVQ Level 2  
GNVQ Intermediate  
RSA Diploma  
City & Guilds Craft  
BTEC, SCOTVEC First or General 
Diploma etc  
O Level, GCSE grade A-C or equivalent
  
 
 
Under O Level: 
NVQ Level 1  
GNVQ, GSVQ Foundation Level  
CSE below grade1, GCSE below grade 
C  
BTEC, SCOTVEC First or General 
certificate 
SCOTVEC modules 
RSA other  
City & Guilds other  
YT, YTP certificate  
Other qualification  
 
No qualifications: 
No qualifications
 
The wider benefits of learning represent a new and exciting topic
of study. There is considerable uncertainty about the effects of
learning but a widely held belief that many aspects of life are
improved by education, with considerable plausible benefits for
the economy. This report describes the available, robust quantitative
evidence for effects of learning on crime and models the cost
implications of this evidence. Estimations are made in terms of the
savings in the reduced social cost of crime if educational investments
were successful.
The report stresses the importance of estimation techniques that
deal with confounding factors and other sources of bias, particularly
the selection bias that results from the fact that people with higher
levels of education receive benefits that may be due to a common
set of underlying advantages that  influence both education and
the outcome variables. Econometric techniques are used to deal
with this problem.
Despite these techniques, a great many assumptions are required
in order to develop costed benefits of education based on the
information available. These assumptions are described in the
report and the uncertainty they introduce must be remembered
when interpreting the results. The exercise has been conducted
as a first step in the Wider Benefits of Learning Research Centre
programme of quantitative research. All conclusions are therefore
given tentatively and thought of as indicative only.
Dr Leon Feinstein is the Research Director for the Centre for
Research on the Wider Benefits of Learning.
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